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Summary
Due to institutional constraints, the UN system is not 
effective in delivering what it promises in terms of 
speedy, relevant and sustained support for peace-
building. Using empirical material from Liberia, I 
show how the very institutional set-up from head-
quarters down to the country level is top-heavy and 
reflects the assumption that UN workers are devel-
opment experts with privileged knowledge of what 
to do to build peace. Formal rules and procedures 
on the institutional level, particularly regarding al-
location of funds, might put local actors in a posi-
tion where they are unable to effectively make use 
of the structures that the international community 
can provide. I illustrate this through the example of 
the institutional practices of Direct versus National 
Execution in the UNDP. Whilst national execution 
by the local government is considered desirable in 
principle, the combination of the self-proclaimed 
authority of the UNDP in development matters, and 
institutional constraints linked to accountability and 
fear of corruption, makes direct execution by the 
internationals the norm in peacebuilding. This ham-
pers efforts to implement local ownership in peace-
building, an element the UN considers crucial to ef-
fective and sustainable peacebuilding.
Introduction
In what is often called “weak states” resulting from 
protracted violent conflict, the UN and coalitions of 
countries are engaging in post-conflict reconstruction 
and peacebuilding all over the world.  In Liberia, such 
a project has been underway since the cessation of 
armed hostilities in 2003. After relative security has 
been established by peacekeeping forces and after 
gene ral elections in 2005, the country is seen as 
being at a crucial stage of the peacebuilding process. 
Inter national actors are implementing an array of 
initiatives and programmes in the country, but the 
UN is not able to deliver what it promises in terms of 
speedy, timely, relevant, sustained financial, military 
and political support. 
How this is an effect of individual peacebuilders’ per-
cep tions and self-conceptions has been treated in a 
previous policy brief (Sending 2009). I will fill out the 
picture by looking at how the UN institutional struc-
ture is not adequately set up to implement effective 
and sustainable peacebuilding. Peacebuilders choose 
to act in different ways, corresponding to their per-
cept ions, but they do not do so under conditions of 
their own choosing. It is important also to look at the 
enabling and constraining institutional and political 
parameters – in short, the structural set-up of the UN. 
Based on fieldwork and interviews with UN staff 
engaged in peacebuilding in the rule of law sector 
in Liberia, I will take a closer look at the work of the 
Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) in Liberia, and illustrate 
institutional restraints to the effective implementation 
of peacebuilding in practice. I will first address the UN 
Headquarters, the UNPBC in New York, and then the 
country level institutions and national government 
and how the institutional logics work in practice. 
As a concrete example of this, I use the practices of 
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Direct Execution (DEX) versus National Execution 
(NEX) by the UNDP. Whilst national execution by 
the local government is considered desirable in prin-
ciple, the combination of the self-proclaimed author-
ity of the UNDP in development matters, and insti-
tutio nal constraints linked to accountability and fear 
of corruption, makes direct execution by the inter-
natio nals the norm in peacebuilding. I conclude that 
the institutional set-up of the UNPBF in Liberia is 
detrimental to the implementation of “local owner-
ship”, an element the UN itself considers crucial to 
effective and sustainable peacebuilding.
I do not claim that the analysis provides an adequate 
account of the state of peacebuilding in Liberia as 
such. Rather, the aim is to grasp the structured logic 
of governing in the interface between external and 
internal actors.
UN Headquarters: The Peacebuilding Commission
The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Com mis-
sion (UNPBC) was motivated by a concern to address 
a “strategic gap” in the institutional set-up of the UN 
to address post-conflict reconstruction. The UNPBC is 
supposed to bring together different actors and mar-
shal resources, but also to be involved in providing 
strategic guidance to specific peacebuilding efforts in 
different countries. 
The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) functions 
as the secretariat for the UNPBC, and is central to this 
over arching peacebuilding strategy. Missions from 
the PBSO are often dispatched to countries on the 
UNPBC agenda, and PBSO teams were brought in to 
assist in preparing for the establishment of UNPBF 
mechan ism in Liberia. The PBSO is the authority on 
peace building, on how funds are to be allocated, and 
what rules and regulations apply for accessing funds 
from the UNPBF. 
The UNPBF, in turn, is one of many multi-donor trust 
funds within the UN. It is supposed to be a “risk taking 
and catalytic instrument for peacebuilding support” 
(UN 2008), focusing on short-term projects to quickly 
and flexibly fill strategic gaps in selected countries’ 
peace building strategies and implementation. All pro-
jects under the UNPBF at the country levels must be of 
a duration of maximum 18 months. It is managed by 
the PBSO under the Secretary-General’s authority, but 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
is the “administrative agent”, assuming responsibility 
for financial aspects and accounting (see below). 
Thus, projects funded by the Peacebuilding Fund at 
the country level have a set-up where – according to 
UNDP rules – UN agencies must be the recipient 
agency.  This puts UN agencies in a powerful position 
vis-à-vis national authorities and other actors at the 
country level.
Implementers and the National Government
Whilst the recipient agency must be a UN organi-
za tion, there are in principle no limitations to who 
might be the so-called “implementing partners”. 
These must, however, apply to the UNPBF Joint 
Steering Committee, which then decides, according 
to its Priority Plan, the Terms of Reference and Rules 
of Procedure (coming from HQ in New York), and a 
report from its “technical advisory panel”, whether to 
give support. The basis for applications is “concept 
notes”, which are called for as well. Some are written 
exclusively by the UN agencies, others are developed 
in partnership between the recipient agencies and 
poten tial implementing partners. 
The UNPBF steering committee in Liberia is co-
chaired by the UN DSRSG1/resident coordinator and 
the Liberian Minister of Internal Affairs, and includes 
15 more representatives, amongst them of USAID, the 
Swedish and U.S. Ambassadors, representatives of 
international NGOs and civil society, and the business 
community. 
A “Peacebuilding Secretariat” supports the Fund. 
It is located in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, 
curiously enough, is itself a UNPBF-funded project. 
The secretariat answers directly to the government of 
Liberia, but is at the same time accountable to UNDP 
regarding the project management, and is of course 
directly answerable to the steering committee as its 
secretariat. The secretariat is there also to ensure 
that the projects report through them to the MDTF. 
The requirement for the implementers is to pick one 
recipient UN agency to collaborate with in order to get 
funding. 
The relationship between the recipient agency and the 
implementing partner does not always run smoothly, 
due to differences in operational procedures, rules 
and regulations, institutional culture, procurement 
policies, but also the view that the UN agencies might 
try to shoehorn themselves into the projects.2 During 
interviews with both the recipient agencies and the 
implementers, there were also contradictory stories 
about how the project came into being, in terms of who 
took the initiative, who convinced who, how much the 
one or the other is contributing to the project, and how 
well it corresponds to the different mandates. 
DEX and NEX as Modes of Operation
According to the Terms of Reference of the Liberian 
peacebuilding fund, UN organizations are to function 
as “recipient organizations” of the Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund, where the money for the Liberian Peacebuilding 
Fund comes. The projects are not to be implemented 
mainly by UN organizations, as the projects should 
1 Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
2 Interview with staff from one implementing partner, Monrovia, 
29/09/09.
3build local capacity, secure ownership etc., and the 
Joint Steering Committee selects the projects. The 
admi nistrative agent is the UNDP. When asked 
directly about the extent to which UNDP in fact did 
take a hands-on approach in managing and being 
sub stantially involved in the PBF-funded projects, 
an UNDP official responded, “Well of course we are. 
We’re development professionals. That’s what we do.” 
This is in part explained by the fact that in Liberia, 
as is the case for most post-conflict countries, UN 
agencies are in so-called DEX mode – Direct Exe cu-
tion. The reasoning behind this is that in order to have 
full control over the use of UN funds, to avoid cor-
rup tion and to minimize fiduciary risks, UN agencies 
do not transfer funds to national authorities and 
then let them distribute money according to their 
pri orities. As said by one UNDP employee, “the UN 
doesn’t want money to pass through the ministries – 
except to the ministry of finance, where people from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers are advisors”.3
Even if ownership is accepted as a principle, one of 
the most commonly referred to qualifying factors is 
the fear of corruption. Despite an idealized vision of 
co ope ration and ownership, there is a lack of trust in 
the government, and no money is going through it.4 
DEX mode, then, is motivated by fiduciary concerns 
and only when the UN trusts national authorities to 
spend and use funds in accordance with established 
rules and regulations do they shift towards NEX 
mode – National Execution. Relating to the issue of 
owner ship in particular, it is interesting to see how 
the relationship between the national government 
and the external changes depending on two “modes 
of operation”. 
Awareness of the tension this implies between the 
principle and practice of ownership does not seem 
to be present amongst any of the senior international 
staff consulted during the fieldwork. That money to 
UNPBF funded projects is channelled through UN 
agencies exclusively is taken for granted. It is a non-
issue.  There are, however, different views on why 
this is so and how it (does not) relate to the issue of 
ownership. 
A political argument in favour of the fact that UN 
agencies have control over the funds and what they go 
to is made in some cases. This is justified by referring 
to the expertise the UN (and especially the UNDP) has 
in developing and managing development projects. 
Related to the expertise argument, it was in one case 
emphasised that all the projects had to go through a top 
UN official’s desk in order to be approved.5 Ownership 
was in the same context defined as a balance of power 
between the national government and the UN agency, 
both politically and financially. However, it was also 
noted that the ownership issue was defined by where 
the power for designing overall strategies lie, and not 
as a financial issue. Correspondingly, the account-
ability argument is most strongly advocated in terms 
of managing finances.
There are some differences in the justification for 
money being channelled exclusively through UN agen-
cies. Some emphasize the purely practical aspects of 
it, that there are already accountability mechanisms in 
place in the UN organizations. Building new account-
ability mechanisms in order to execute NEX would 
then be a waste of resources.6 Most would however 
argue, as alluded to above, that this practice is self-evi-
dent. It is UN money, and they should thus be man-
aged and distributed by the UN.7 When asked why 
these funds were distributed through UN agencies, 
one respondent said: “Of course it goes through UN 
agen cies. It’s UN money.”8
Generally, the choice of execution mode is a big issue in 
UN circles. However, Liberia is in DEX mode, despite 
often being seen as a shining example of the success 
of coordinated peacebuilding efforts. As one official 
explained to us on the centrality of the issue, and from 
a rather different perspective from that of the above 
guidelines, “the more desperate the government is 
to have their hands on things, the more nervous the 
UNDP gets”. It was pointed out that this is not the case 
with the Liberian government. Still, Liberia is in “DEX 
mode”. And how could it be otherwise, “how can it be 
DEX if it is in a NEX environment?”9 This is but one 
expression of some of the “infrastructural” constraints 
on efforts to establish national ownership.
Accountability as Local Ownership
There exists what could be called a “double accountability 
problem”: All funds have to go through UN recipient 
agents, so there is no or little accountability to the 
“population”. In addition, the UN agencies themselves 
are controlling and monitoring projects, which imply 
lim ited accountability to donors. Nevertheless, the pic-
ture is not one-sided. Government agencies often do 
have considerable power in peacebuilding operations, 
especially concerning the allocation of funds. As seen, 
account ability is considered the responsibility of the 
UN agencies, and thus poses a paradox. On the one 
side, government ownership can be said to be re-
stric ted because funds are processed through UN 
agen cies solely, as they do not trust the ministries. 
On the other hand, by government interventions, 
chan ges are frequently made to the budgets after the 
3 Interview with UNPBF staff, Monrovia, 02/05/09.
4 Interview with UNPBF staff, Monrovia, 02/05/09.
5 Interview with UNDP official, Monrovia, October 2009.
6 Interview with UNHCR officials, Monrovia, 02/10/09.
7 Interview with UN-HABITAT staff, Monrovia, October 2009; In-
terview with UNMIL official, Monrovia, 02/10/09.
8 Interview with UNDP official, Monrovia, October 2009.
9 Interview with UNDP official, Monrovia, October 2009.
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final approval.10 This, then, happens outside of estab -
lished accountability mechanisms, and points to the 
paradoxes in the practice of (mainly financial) owner-
ship. 
NEX is seen as in principle desirable, because it cor-
re sponds with the principle of state sovereignty and 
national ownership. However, the norm in peace-
building is Direct Execution by the UNDP. The reason 
is that the UNDP operates with certain criteria for when 
the organization can allow money to be managed by 
the national authorities. These criteria include revision 
and accounting standards and routines that must be 
fulfilled to avoid corruption. The use of DEX on the 
country level as an institutional interface between 
the UN and Liberia has direct consequences for the 
position and role of the peacebuilders on the country 
level. UNDP exercises a role as gatekeeper, guide, and 
examiner to Liberian actors. This institutional structure 
of DEX is one of the premises for the workings of the 
Peacebuilding Fund, and contributes in practice to 
weaken the implementation of local ownership. 
Policy recommendations
– There is little “dialogical accountability” – that is, 
the opportunity to publicly contest and discuss. The 
pre sent system is focussing mainly on “internal 
account ability”, but there should be fora in which 
external actors – both donors and local actors – can 
discuss and contest. There should be dialogue on 
the very core struc tural features of the organization, 
often taken for granted as just the technical “conveyor 
belt” when it in fact has political consequences. 
 
– The government is often prioritized as the 
“ownership partner”. There should be more focus 
on popular ownership, not only in specific projects 
“on the ground”, but also on the institutional level.
– Formal and structural rules, such as in the cases 
of NEX/DEX and transfer of funds, might put 
local actors in a position of structural dependence. 
Furthermore, institutional rules might put local 
actors in a position where they are unable to 
effectively make use of the structures that the 
international community can provide. Fiduciary 
concerns are important, but the basic structural 
set-up should be assessed with the aim to reduce 
and simplify administrative procedures and 
institutionalize the principle of local ownership. 
– The relationship between external and internal actors 
should be gradually and continuously renegotiated 
to make it more equal and not determined based on 
strict rules for e.g. what is a technically assessable 
NEX or DEX “environment”.
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